Petitioners sought peremptory writ to order respondent Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) to vacate its order denying petitioners' motions for summary judgment in action brought by real party in interest for contribution and indemnification. Petitioners asserted that they were not liable when there was no potential for coverage under their policy and they were not bound under doctrine of collateral estoppel by prior decision.
The court granted petitioners' request for peremptory writ to order respondent trial court to vacate order that denied petitioners' motions for summary judgment. Real party in interest and petitioners were all insurers of tenant. Tenant was sued by landlord for waste and breach of commercial lease demanding damages for unpaid rent and damage to property. Tenant was successful in declaratory judgment action against real party in interest to determine coverage and duty to defend. Real party in interest defended tenant and sought contribution and indemnification from petitioners. The court held that petitioners were not liable for contribution or indemnification when, despite the fact their policies were substantially identical, there was never any potential for coverage. The court found that the claims, based on breach of contract, were not covered under the plain language of the policy and that the court that issued the declaratory judgment erred in finding an ambiguity. The court held that petitioners were not bound under doctrine of collateral estoppel by declaratory judgment action when they were not parties to that action. The court ordered judgment for petitioners.
The defendant had a civil defense lawyer California present a strong defense at trial to the jury. The court granted petitioners' request for a writ to order respondent to vacate order denying motions for summary judgment and ordered judgment entered on behalf of petitioners. The court held that petitioners were not liable for contribution or indemnification when there was no potential for coverage. The court found that petitioners were not bound by decision of separate court finding coverage when they were not parties to that suit.
Plaintiff employee sued defendant employer for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Gov. Code, §§ 12900-12996, breach of an implied-in-fact contract requiring good cause for termination, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and defamation. The Los Angeles County Superior Court (California) granted the employer's motion to compel arbitration and confirmed an arbitration award for the employer. The employee appealed.
At issue was a mandatory arbitration agreement that the employer and its at-will employees had purportedly entered into requiring the arbitration of claims by both sides. The court determined that a court could resolve the question of whether the agreement was illusory. The court found valid the agreement's choice-of-law clause stating it was to be governed by Texas law and the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16). The employer had a substantial relationship to Texas and engaged in interstate commerce. An arbitration contract containing a modification provision was illusory if an amendment, modification, or revocation applied to claims that had accrued or were known to the employer. If a modification provision was restricted — by express language or by terms implied under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing — so that it exempted all claims, accrued or known, from a contract change, the arbitration contract was not illusory. The court agreed with the employee that the agreement was illusory under Texas law because the employer retained the unilateral right to amend, modify, or revoke it on 30 days' advance written notice, with the change to apply to any unfiled claim.
The court reversed the orders and remanded the matter.
